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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Durkin v. Lewitz4" that Illinois has "firmly and decisively fixed upon the
landlord the duty to use reasonable care with respect to the premises used
in common...-4 which includes the removal of snow and ice.
4
1
Thus, New York has modified the Massachusetts rule and Ohio and
Illinois no longer follow it. In 1954, the Illinois court observed that the
authorities appeared to be about equally divided. 48 Since 1954, there is
apparently a growing majority following the Connecticut rule, and
most of the courts not bound by earlier decisions which have, in recent years,
passed upon the question, have held that the landlord's general duty to exercise
reasonable care to keep the parts of the premises retained on the landlord's con-
trol for the common use of his tenants in reasonably safe condition for the con-
templated use may, in a proper situation, include the duty of removing natural
accumulations of ice and snow from the common ways or structures. 49
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, has clearly
adopted the Connecticut rule on the basis of the sounder rationale on
which tile rule rests. This is the same logical foundation on which preced-
ing cases have formed a growing majority. Langhorne Road Apartments,
Inc. is an important decision in this emerging majority holding the land-
lord liable for injuries due to the snow and ice on the common premises.
Bruce Samlan
45 Supra note 3. 47 Ibid.
46 Id. at 484, 123 N.E.2d at 156. 48 Durkin v. Lewitz, supra note 3.
49 Sidle v. Humphrcy, supra note 3, at -, 220 N.E.2d at 683.
PUBLIC WELFARE-STRIKER'S RIGHT TO
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
The plaintiffs instituted a taxpayer's action to enjoin the use of public
funds for the payment of public assistance to strikers and their families.
The trial court found for the defendants and refused issuance of an in-
junction. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and held that
strikers and their families are eligible for aid under the Illinois Public
Assistance Code.1 The court held strikers, whose need for aid arises solely
and initially from participation in a strike arising out of a labor dispute,
1 ILL. Riv. STAT. ch. 23, §401 (1965): "The alleviation and prevention of pov-
erty and substandard economic conditions existing in some segments of the State
is an essential governmental objective. Persons who for unavoidable causes are
unable to maintain a decent and healthful standard of living, or whose families are
unable to provide them a reasonable subsistence, shall be eligible to receive aid in meet-
ing their minimum subsistence requirements .. .through a grant of general assistance
under this Article if such persons: ... (d) do not refuse suitable employment or train-
ing for self-support work, as hereinafter in this section provided."
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to be persons who met the aid eligibility requirements of the Code 2 in
as much as they were unable to maintain a decent and healthful standard
of living for unavoidable causes and did not refuse suitable employment
or training for self-support work. Strat-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 72 I11.
App. 2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 227 (1966).
The question of payment of public assistance to strikers and their families
where need arises solely from participation in a labor strike is one of
first impression in the Illinois courts. This note will probe the legislative
intent underlying the Public Assistance Code and the Unemployment
Compensation Act,3 policy statements made by Illinois Attorney Gener-
als, 4 and the legislature's acquiescence to the current administrative inter-
pretation of the Public Assistance Code. An understanding of the impact
and effect of this decision on organized labor, strikers, and their families
then will be possible.
Before the institution of this proceeding, the present Illinois Public
Assistance Code had been in its same form for thirteen years. During this
period the administrators of the relief funds have regularly granted relief
to strikers and their families, and this policy never has been judicially
challenged. Even under the prior public aid legislation5' in effect in 1904,
the case of City of Spring Valley v. County of Bureau6 represents the
only other case in Illinois history concerning the payment of public as-
sistance to strikers. In that case, the county board had attempted to ex-
clude strikers from the relief roles, and the court, relying on the reasoning
in an English case 7 that was factually similar, condemned the county
board for acting beyond the legislative prescription.
It is not the purpose of the statute to permit the county board to discriminate
between different classes or persons of different occupations. [If] the county
may by a rule of its own making, exempt itself from liability on the ground that
the party had gone on a strike or refused work when he could have obtained it,
or other like pretext, then, in effect, the statute is nullified by the action of the
board, and exceptions and provisos engrafted on it where none existed as the
law was made.8
In like effect, the court in Strat-O-Seal found no basis in the present
statute for distinguishing between strikers and other persons entitled to
public aid. However, the plaintiffs in the instant case urged court appli-
cation of the public policy expressed in the striker exclusion clause of
" Ibid. " IL. REV. STAr. ch. 48, § 300 (1965).
4 Opinion of the Attorney General, May 5, 1950 (unpublished opinion on file in
De Paul Law Review); 1962 Ois. A'l-r'y GEN. 189 (1962).
DILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 107, § 24 (1903). 6 115 11. App. 545 (1904).
7 Attorney General v. Merthyr Tydfil Union, 23 ENt. RUL. CAs. 14 (1900).
8 Supra note 6, at 548-49.
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the Unemployment Compensation Act." That policy specifically excludes
strikers from receiving benefits of unemployment compensation' ° while
the Public Assistance Code is silent on the question of need resulting from
participation in a labor strike."
In support of their theory, the plaintiffs contended that any other in-
terpretation of the Public Assistance Code would result in state abandon-
ment of its policy of neutrality in labor disputes. 12 It was further argued
that the legislature would be financing strikes out of public funds.13 Fur-
thermore, they challenged the general statement of policy in the Public
Assistance Code of maintaining "a decent and heathful standard of living"
for the recipient and his family,14 and also contended that an individual
who went on strike was voluntarily unemployed and therefore should
not be eligible for state compensation. 15
In addition to these arguments, the court was faced with the difficult
problem of interpreting the language of the Public Assistance Code. The
legislature had failed to exercise its power of reasonably defining the terms
of the statutelG As a result, the burden of interpreting such phrases as
"unavoidable causes," "decent and healthful standard of living," "reason-
9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 434 (1965): "An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
for any week with respect to which it is found that his total orpartial unemployment
is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory,
establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed ......
10 See generally as to labor dispute disqualification for unemployment compensa-
tion: Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17
U. CnL L. REV. 294 (1950). See also 31 CHI-KEN-r L. REV. 376 (1953); 56 Nw. U.L.
REv. 662 (1961).
11 Brief for Appellee, p. 17, Strat-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 72 I11. App. 2d 480, 218
N.E.2d 227 (1966).
12 Brief for Appellant, Strat-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, supra note 11, citing Buch-
holtz v. Cummins, 6 I11. 2d 382, 386, 128 N.E.2d 900, 902 (1955): "By this provision
the Illinois Legislature adopted the policy that the State shall not, by payment of
unemployment compensation, assist one party to a labor dispute, regardless of fault;
and that the State in cases of industrial strife ought not take sides and place blame.
This provision was designed to maintain neutrality of the State in labor disputes."
'3 Local Union No. 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N.E.2d 637 (1947). The case affirms
state legislative policy of refusing to finance labor strikes out of public funds.
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 101 (1965): "The maintenance of the family unit shall be
a principal consideration in the administration of this Code, and all public assistance
poilcies shall be formulated and administered with the purpose of strengthening the
family unit."
15 American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 111. 174, 88 N.E.2d 465 (1949).
16 Modern Dairy Co. Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 413 111. 55, 66, 108 N.E.2d 8, 14
(1952): "The legislature has the power to make any reasonable definition of the terms
in a statute, and such definitions, for the purpose of the act, will be sustained." See also
Bohn v. State Employees' Retirement Sys., 404 I11. 117, 88 N.E.2d 29 (1949); Krebs v.
Thompson, 387 Ill. 471, 56 N.E.2d 761 (1944); Smith v. Murphy, 384 111. 34, 50 N.E.2d
844 (1943).
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able subsistence," and "refuse suitable employment ' 17 was placed upon the
courts and agencies to be resolved on an individual basis.
When a legislature enacts a statute it enacts certain words, and nothing else. It
knows that these words will come up for interpretation by the courts and ad-
ministrative agencies, because it knows that they will have to apply its words to
particular occasions. The only intention of the legislature is that the courts and
agencies shall interpret its words in the immediate presence of the particular oc-
casion. However wise a legislature may be, however foresighted, even propheti-
cal, it is dealing exclusively with what may happen. The courts and agencies are
at grips with what did happen and with what is happening.'
8
In preparing an analysis of these vague areas of the statute, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and stated that to apply the labor dis-
pute disqualification of the Unemployment Compensation Act 19 to the
Public Assistance Code would be to impose economic sanctions not spe-
cifically required by the statute. Such an interpretation would end state
neutrality in that the strong arm of the state would be employed to stran-
gle otherwise authorized activity.
The court emphasized that adoption of the plaintiffs' line of reasoning
would "create a blanket classification when the Code itself conveys the
thought that the propriety of assistance rests on individual need and indi-
vidual performance. '20 Thus the court distinguished between the policies
underlying the Public Assistance Code and the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act. For support of its conclusion, the court turned to the legis-
lature and the Attorney General of Illinois for opinions on this precise
question. The present construction of the Public Assistance Code evolved
after the court acknowledged legislative acquiescence to administrative
interpretation and examined a published and unpublished opinion of the
Attorney General of Illinois.
The unpublished opinion of May 5, 1950, expressed the view that a
labor strike was an "unavoidable cause" within the statute and stated:
It is my opinion that subject to the approval of the Illinois Public Aid Commis-
sion, if otherwise eligible a person 'in need' due to 'unavoidable causes' is enti-
tled to receive Public Assistance, even though he may be out of employment
because of a strike.
21
17 Supra note 1.
18 Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, in JURISPRUDENCE IN AcrION, 131,
143 (1953).
19 Mohler v. Dept. of Labor, 409 I11. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762 (1951); Walgreen Co. v.
Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 53 N.E.2d 390 (1944); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Durkin, 380
111. 11, 42 N.E.2d 541 (1942); Kemp v. Div. No. 241, 255 11. 213, 99 N.E. 389 (1912).
These cases generally support the proposition that the Legislature intended that only
persons involuntarily unemployed should receive compensation, and one who strikes
becomes voluntarily unemployed and does not fall within that class.
20 Strat-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 72 111. App. 2d 480, 486, 218 N.E.2d 227, 230 (1966).
21 Opinion of the Attorney General, supra note 4.
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The published opinion, dated January 19, 1962, was used by the court to
note that children of strikers were not precluded from receiving public
assistance, "2 and the opinion reads in part as follows:
The Illinois Public Aid Commission also has this authority under Paragraph 607
of the Illinois Public Assistance Code, and nothing in the statutory sections dis-
cussed herein precludes the payment of Aid to Dependent Children to the chil-
dren of persons engaged in a labor strike, where the other tests of eligibility are
nmet.
2 3
Tile court in the Strat-O-Seal case accorded considerable weight to
these opinions of the Attorney Generals.24 Tle court, citing City of
Champaign v. Hill,25 recognized that these opinions were not supported
by any authority. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged them as the
legal opinions of the chief law officer of the State of Illinois on the precise
question before the court. The Illinois courts in cases of first impression
are afforded greater latitude in reaching a just result,26 and consequently
these opinions received significant recognition.
Furthermore, the statute has remained unaltered through successive
sessions of the General Assembly indicating legislative acquiescence in the
current administrative interpretation.2 7 The court felt that the adminis-
trative construction correctly reflected the intent of the legislators since the
legislature failed to amend the statute.
The legislation covering public assistance in some of the other north-
22 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 605.3 (1965).
23 1962 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 189, 192 (1962).
24 The Illinois courts recognize that while the opinion of the Attorney General may
not be binding on the court, it is persuasive. See Long v. Long, 15 111. App. 2d 276, 145
N.E.2d 509 (1957); Rogers Park Post No. 108 American Legion v. Benza, 8 I11. 2d 286,
134 N.E.2d 292 (1956).
25 29 I11. App. 2d 429, 444, 173 N.E.2d 839, 846 (1961). The City of Champaign
brought an action for a declaratory judgment construing the statute authorizing pay-
ment to municipalities of fines collected for violation of the Uniform Act Regulating
Traffic. The opinion of the Attorney General on this precise question was accorded
considerable weight by the court.
2 6Rule v. Rule, 313 111. App. 108, 110, 39 N.E.2d 379, 380 (1942). Although not
relied upon by the court, the Rule case stated that "this being a case of first impres-
sion, we feel at liberty to adopt the rule which, in our judgment, best conforms to the
principles of equity and which tend [sic] to the furtherance of justice."
27 Spiegel v. Lyons, 1 111. 2d 409, 414, 115 N.E.2d 894, 898 (1953). The court cited
this case in support of the proposition that the legislature's failure to anend the
statute in light of its administrative interpretation amounted to legislative acquiescence.
See also The County of Winnebago v. Tile Industrial Comm'n, 34 111. 2d 332, 215
N.E.2d 258 (1966); Rockford Memorial Hosp. Assn v. Whaples, 25 111. App. 2d 79,
165 N.E.2d 523 (1960); Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959);
Bell v. South Cook County Mosquito Abatement Dist., 3 111. 2d 353, 121 N.E.2d 473
(1954); Consumers Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 364 111. 145, 4 N.E.2d 34 (1936).
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eastern states28 also gives administrative authorities great latitude and dis-
cretion in the dispensing of public funds. Most of these statutes also are
silent on the question of need arising solely and initially from a labor
strike. Because public policy underlying statutory enactment is individu-
ally determined in each state,29 it is difficult to speculate what effect, if
any, the current interpretation of the Illinois Public Assistance Code will
have in these other jurisdictions. Each state court will have to weigh the
similarities and differences between its statute and the Illinois Public As-
sistance Code.
However, in Illinois, the impact of the Strat-O-Seal Manufacturing v.
Scott decision is clear. The appellate court judicially has sanctioned the
administrative policy of allowing strikers, who are otherwise eligible for
public assistance, to receive public aid when their need arises solely by
reason of a labor strike. This decision, in addition to financially involving
the state in labor disputes,30 gives strikers a substantive, unchallengeable
right to such aid. Organized labor now can assure its members that they
will be able to maintain a level of subsistence during periods of labor




8 N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW ANN. art. 5, tit. 1, § 131 (Thompson 1966); Omo Rvv.
CODE ch. 5113, § 5113.04 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2508.1 (Cum. Supp. 1965).
29 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Moll, 115 Ind. App. 289, 58 N.E.2d 947 (1945).
30 Supra note 13.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-FAILURE TO USE SEAT BELTS
HELD NOT TO CONSTITUTE A DEFENSE
The plaintiff brought an action against the driver of the automobile in
which she was riding for injuries sustained by her when it collided with
another automobile. The defendant asserted the defense that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent because of her failure to fasten the seat belt
which was provided for her. After granting the plaintiff's motion to strike
the defendant's defense, the jury awarded damages to the plaintiff. The
District Court of Appeals of Florida affirmed the trial court by holding
that a defendant cannot offer to the jury evidence of the plaintiff's failure
to use a seat belt as constituting a defense to gross negligence on the part
of the defendant driver. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1966).
Brown v. Kendrick is the first appellate court case in which the defense
arising out of a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt has been decided. The
purpose of this note will be to trace the treatment of the problems spring-
ing from a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt and the effect that this higher
